Originally published July 10, 2025 by Judy Warner at The Electronics Eecosystem

When it comes to practical, actionable DFM (Design for Manufacturability), I have one go-to person: Gerry Partida, VP of Technology at Summit Interconnect.

I’ve known Gerry for over a decade and have always appreciated how he brings clarity to the often-murky space between PCB layout and fabrication. With more than 25 years of experience preparing fabrication files, Gerry has become a trusted authority on all things DFM.

Early in my career, I spent 16 years selling PCB fabrication services. I worked closely with designers, engineering teams, and manufacturing managers–constantly bridging the gap between design engineers and front-end engineering teams at board shops. Over time, it became crystal clear that a successful PCB design didn’t just rely on the designer, but equally on the skill, DFM expertise, and communication of the fabricator’s front-end engineer. That perspective sharpened my ability to recognize real DFM talent—and Gerry stood out from the start. He’s been my go-to expert ever since.

So today, I’d like to (re)introduce you to Gerry and pass along the top DFM lessons I’ve learned from his decades of experience. I hope these insights help your next design handoff go more smoothly—and help you avoid costly delays or respins.

Top Seven DFM Tips I’ve Learned from Gerry

Here’s a concise list of DFM best practices Gerry consistently emphasizes:

1. “Control what you can control.”
This is Gerry’s cornerstone principle. Don’t leave critical manufacturing decisions—like stackup, padstack specs, or impedance targets—to the fabricator. The clearer and more intentional you are, the better your outcomes.

2. Don’t assume your fabricator knows your intent.
Designers often assume their fab house will “get what I mean.” They won’t. Be explicit—especially around impedance control, materials, and via structures. When possible, include supporting data.

3. Communicate early and often.
Working on a high-speed or complex board? Reach out to your fabricator before finalizing your design. A 15-minute call could save you days—or even weeks—of production delays.

4. Avoid Gerber-only packages.
Gerbers alone are risky. Provide a full data package with intelligent formats like ODB++ or IPC-2581, plus fab drawings, netlists, and material specs to avoid misinterpretation.

5. Don’t recycle old fab notes.
Copying fab notes from previous designs without reviewing them is a common mistake. Always update notes to reflect the current design and manufacturing requirements.

6. Be realistic with annular ring and drill tolerances.
Just because it passes in CAD doesn’t mean it will work in the shop. Account for drill wander and registration tolerances when defining via and pad sizes.

7. Know your fabricator’s capabilities.
Not all shops are built for HDI, flex, or RF boards. Match your design to your fabricator’s strengths—and if you’re unsure, ask early.

Why This Matters

As Gerry often says: “A design isn’t successful until it’s built, tested, and shipped—without drama.” And that success starts long before your board hits the fab floor.

Too often, designs are delayed or rejected because critical data was missing, assumptions were made, or documentation was unclear. The fix? Start thinking like a manufacturing partner, not just a designer.

If you’re a layout engineer, hardware designer, or someone who regularly interfaces with your CM or fabricator, you owe it to yourself to learn from experts like Gerry Partida. His practical wisdom has saved more than a few projects and reputations.

“The next war might be won—or lost—22,000 miles above Earth.”

That’s not science fiction. It’s the stark reality defense planners are beginning to confront as space transitions from a support domain to a full-spectrum warfighting environment. For decades, the United States held an uncontested advantage in space, relying on exquisite, few, and highly capable systems to enable precision warfare, real-time intelligence, and global communications. Today, that edge is under siege.

Adversaries like China and Russia are investing heavily in space denial capabilities—from ground-based lasers and jammers to co-orbital anti-satellite weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S. military is still adapting to a landscape where resilience, redundancy, and rapid deployment matter more than technical elegance. If the U.S. cannot adapt fast enough, its long-held orbital superiority may become its greatest vulnerability.

From Strategic Advantage to Strategic Liability

Space was once a sanctuary—a quiet, strategic perch where U.S. dominance provided unmatched battlefield awareness. Systems like GPS, SBIRS, and WGS satellites helped revolutionize American warfighting doctrine, underpinning the precision strikes that defined Desert Storm and the counterinsurgency operations that followed.

But this model has aged poorly. Relying on a handful of high-value satellites created a “target-rich environment” for adversaries. A single missile or kinetic interceptor can now blind an entire ISR constellation or disrupt transcontinental command-and-control. In a future conflict, the first shots may not be fired on land, sea, or air but in space.

China, Russia, and the New Space Threat Landscape

The most visible shift in the space security dynamic began with China’s 2007 kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) test. By destroying a defunct weather satellite, China not only generated thousands of pieces of debris but also sent a message: American satellites are not untouchable.

Since then, China’s space capabilities have grown exponentially. The People’s Liberation Army views space dominance as a prerequisite for achieving “informational warfare.” This includes jamming GPS, spoofing satellite feeds, and deploying dual-use platforms that blur the line between civilian and military intent. China’s BeiDou system, for example, is both a navigation aid and a resilient alternative to GPS.

Russia, too, has made alarming strides. Its electronic warfare systems have jammed satellite communications in Eastern Europe. Even more concerning, its suspected “nesting doll” satellites—equipped to maneuver near and possibly damage other spacecraft—have raised alarms at U.S. Space Command. Russia’s military doctrine openly describes space as a domain for preemptive disruption of enemy capabilities.

Beyond these major powers, countries like Iran and North Korea are making strides in space launch technology and cyber capabilities, while non-state actors could one day target vulnerable ground stations or exploit commercial satellites.

The U.S. Response: A Shift Toward Resilience

Recognizing the fragility of its current architecture, the United States has begun a pivot. The creation of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command signaled a doctrinal shift. But it’s the Space Development Agency (SDA) that’s truly changing how America builds for space.

Instead of betting on a few large, high-cost assets, the SDA is fielding proliferated constellations: dozens, even hundreds, of smaller, lower-cost satellites in low and medium Earth orbits. These networks are designed for redundancy, quick refresh rates, and contested operations. The National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA), for example, includes layers for tracking hypersonic assets, enabling communications, and maintaining command and control during a kinetic attack.

Yet challenges persist. Acquisition timelines remain sluggish compared to commercial counterparts. Budget volatility disrupts long-term planning. And the Defense Industrial Base—especially in satellite bus manufacturing, space-qualified components, and PCB fabrication—remains shallow and overly consolidated.

The Commercial Conundrum: Help or Hazard?

One of the most dramatic developments in the new space race is the rise of commercial players. SpaceX, Amazon Kuiper, Planet, and others are reshaping global access to orbit. On one hand, they offer the Pentagon low-cost launch, rapid innovation, and scalable infrastructure. On the other, they introduce strategic ambiguity.

Ukraine’s use of Starlink is a prime example. SpaceX’s satellites provided critical communications during Russia’s invasion, so much so that Russia labeled the constellation a legitimate military target. What happens when a commercial satellite becomes a casualty of war? Who responds? Is it an act of war, or just collateral damage?

The dual-use dilemma—civilian infrastructure providing military advantage—creates new legal, strategic, and deterrence challenges that policymakers haven’t fully grappled with.

What Comes Next: Strategic Recommendations

If the United States intends to preserve its edge in space, it must think differently:

1. Accelerate acquisition. Pentagon timelines must align with the speed of technological change. Streamlined funding and contracting for LEO/MEO constellations is essential.
2. Harden infrastructure. Satellites must be built to survive jamming, directed energy, and cyber intrusion. That includes encrypting links, dispersing ground stations, and eliminating single points of failure.
3. Define thresholds. A formal deterrence doctrine for space is overdue. What actions warrant a kinetic response? What constitutes a red line? Clear policy is vital for maintaining strategic stability.
4. Build alliances. Space is global. Sharing sensor data, building coalition constellations, and engaging in joint deterrence with NATO, Five Eyes, and Indo-Pacific partners is key.
5. Invest in situational awareness. The ability to track, catalog, and attribute hostile behavior in orbit is critical. Space debris, proximity ops, and spoofing need persistent monitoring.
6. Revitalize the Defense Industrial Base, starting with PCB manufacturing. Behind every satellite, radar, and guidance system is a network of printed circuit boards (PCBs), and the domestic supply chain for these critical components is shrinking. The U.S., by most estimates, has fewer than 140 PCB fabricators, down from over 2,000 in the 1990s. With far fewer having the equipment sets, certifications, or technical capability to support space PCBs. This erosion creates serious vulnerabilities in defense systems, especially those deployed in space. Revitalization will require a blend of tax incentives, purchase guarantees, and direct investment to modernize facilities, secure rare earth inputs, and re-shore advanced fabrication capabilities. No mission-critical system reaches orbit without a functioning, secure PCB backbone.

Conclusion: Hold the High Ground—Or Lose It

Space is no longer a quiet backdrop to terrestrial conflict. It is the new high ground—and it is contested. If the United States clings to legacy architectures and procurement timelines, it will cede this domain to adversaries who are moving faster and taking bigger risks.

The challenge is clear: build smaller, faster, and smarter. Partner with industry. Clarify doctrine. And above all, act with urgency. Because in the race for orbital dominance, second place is not an option.

This article originally appeared in iConnect007 on June 17, 2025